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Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.: The
Supreme Court Narrows the Jury's Role in
Patent Litigation

The number of patent cases tried to a jury has burgeoned in recent
years.' From 1968 to 1970, more than ninety-six percent of all patent
trials were bench trials;2 ih the fiscal year 1994, seventy percent of
patent trials were tried to a jury.3 Because patent infringement actions
begin with interpretation of the often highly technical and complex
patent claim, the role of juries in patent litigation suits has become
controversial. 4 The general right to a jury trial in an infringement
action has never been seriously questioned.' However, this general
right to a jury trial does not address the allocation between the judge
and the jury of specific issues that arise within a patent infringement
action.6 In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,7 the United States
Supreme Court addressed whether the interpretation of patent claims
is a matter exclusively for the judge or is subject to the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury.8
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Herbert Markman invented and patented an inventory control system
for dry cleaning businesses. The system monitors the progress of
customers' clothes through the dry cleaning process.9 Markman's
system, described in his patent claim as "capable of monitoring and

1, See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980-81 (Fed. Cir.), uacated, 115 S. Ct. 29 (1995).
2. 50 F.3d at 980.
3. Id. at 981 n.1.
4, Paul N. Higbee, Jr., The Jury's Role in Patent Cases: Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 407, 407 (1996).
5. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 981; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 116 S.
Ct. 1384, 1389 (1996).

6. 50 F.3d at 981.
7. 116 S. Ct. 1384.
8. Id. at 1387.

,9. Id. at 1388.
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reporting upon the status, location and throughput of inventory in an
establishment," keeps a record of all clothing brought in, and generates
a customer receipt, a management copy of that receipt, and multiple bar
code tags to be attached to the individual articles of clothing." These
bar code tags can be read using an optical detector, thus enabling
management to reconcile inventory at any point in the dry cleaning
process."
Markman brought a patent infringement claim against Westview, the
manufacturer of a device that prints a bar-coded ticket with information
about the customer, the articles of clothing to be cleaned, and the
amount due; however, the device permanently records only the invoice
number, date, and amount. 2 The Westview system cannot track
individual articles of clothing." The specific interpretation issue was
whether the term "inventory" as used in Markman's patent claim refers
to both the physical inventory (the clothing) and the cash inventory (the
invoices) or only to the cash inventory. 4 The jury found infringement
of the claim, thus implicitly adopting the interpretation of inventory as
only the cash inventory. 5
The district court judge, however, in granting Westview's previously
deferred motion for judgment as a matter of law, adopted the broader
interpretation of inventory as both the physical and cash inventories and
accordingly found no infringement."
Markman appealed, and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed en banc that "in a case
tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to construe as a7
matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously
affirmed the court of appeals, holding that patent claim interpretation
is exclusively for the court and, thus, removing patent claim interpretation from the jury. 8

10.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd,

116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
11. 52 F.3d at 972.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 973.
14. Id.
15. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1388. To literally infringe, an accused process or device
must contain every element of the patent holder's claim. Id.
16. Id.
17. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
18. 116 S. Ct. at 1387, 1389.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
An inquiry into the jury's role in patent claim interpretation necessarily entails examination of two areas of the law: first, the Seventh
Amendment right totrial by jury; second, the jury's role in patent
litigation in general and in patent claim interpretation in particular.
The right to a trial by jury has always been considered a basic and
fundamental part of American jurisprudence. 9 Justice Story wrote in
1830 that the right to trial by jury must be jealously guarded by the
courts.2" However, the scope of the right conferred by the Seventh
Amendment2 1 is difficult to discern. The language of the amendment
is general, and almost no direct evidence of the intentions of the
Framers exists.22
The early federal courts construed the Seventh Amendment to
guarantee a right to jury trial in suits in which legal rights are
ascertained and determined. In Parsons v. Bedford,23 Justice Story
explained that the Seventh Amendment phrase "suits at common law"
is used in contradistinction to suits in equity or admiralty.2 4 In
Baltimore & CarolinaLine v. Redman, 5 the Court stated that the right
preserved by the Seventh Amendment has the same characteristics as
the right that existed under English common law in 1791, the year the
Amendment was adopted. 6

i9. E.g., Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942).
20. Parsons v. Bedford. 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830).
21. The Seventh Amendment states in part that "[in suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
22. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973); Edith Guild Henderson, The
Background of the Seuenth Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 289-91 (1966). The Senate
proceedings on the Bill of Rights were not made public, and the brief debate in the House
of Representatives focused not on the content of the amendments but whether the
Constitution ought to be amended at all so soon after its initial ratification. During the
constitutional convention of 1787, there was a brief discussion of the lack of a civil right
to a trial by jury. The Anti-Federalist delegates pointed out that no provision had been
made for civil jury trials, and a formal motion was made to add to Article III this
guarantee; however, this motion was defeated because there was such diversity of civil
practice among the states that no single formula could satisfy everyone. The same
difficulty existed in drafting the Seventh Amendment and accounts for the general
language of the amendment. Henderson, supra, at 291-95.

23. 28 U.S. 433 (1830).
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 446-47.
295 U.S. 654 (1935).
Id. at 657.
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More recent decisions, however, recognize that the scope of the
Seventh Amendment guarantee extends well beyond the common-law
causes of action recognized by English law in 1791. In Curtis v.
Loether,27 the Court held that the Seventh Amendment guarantee
applies to actions enforcing a post-1791 statutory claim founded on legal
rights and authorizing legal remedies, even if no such cause of action
existed in England in 1791.28 In Tul1 v. United States, 29 the Court
interpreted the Seventh Amendment to require a jury trial in actions
that are analogous to suits at common law.3 ° In Ross v. Bernhard,"
the Court stated that an issue is classified as legal, and therefore subject
to the Seventh Amendment guarantee, by considering three factors: (1)
the custom of handling such issues in England prior to the merger of the
courts of law and equity; (2) the nature of the remedy sought; and (3) the
"practical abilities and limitations of juries." 2 However, in Tu, the
Court held that this third factor has never been considered as an
independent basis for extending the Seventh Amendment guarantee.33
In GranfinancieraS.A. v. Nordberg,a4 the Court declared the nature of
the remedy sought the more important consideration.3
In 1990, in
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 6 the Court
affirmed that the nature of the issues tried and the remedy sought, not
the action as a whole, determine the right to a jury trial.37
An examination of the jury's role in patent claim interpretation
requires a basic understanding of the American patent system. Among

27.
28.
29.
30.

415 U.S. 189 (1974).
Id. at 194.
481 U.S. 412 (1987).
Id. at 417.

31, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
32. Id. at 538 n.10.
33. 481 U.S. at 418 n.4. Two years later, in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
33, 42 n.4 (1989), the Court noted that this consideration of jury ability and functional
compatibility was relevant only in determining whether a jury trial was compatible with
a legislative scheme in which Congress has empowered an administrative agency or
specialized court of equity to resolve disputes. The Court has held that the functional
capabilities of a jury are inconsistent with administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Pernell
v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937).
34. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
35. Id. at 42.
36. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
37. Id. at 570-73. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan expressed the view that the
nature of the remedy sought should be the only test used when analyzing for the Seventh
Amendment guarantee because the historical test is too difficult to apply, and the nature
of the remedy prong alone will yield an accurate and more manageable analysis. Id. at
574-79 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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the Article I, section 8 enumerated powers granted to Congress is the
power to "promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited
Times to ... Inventors ... the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries."s Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790; the resulting
"first-to-invent system" gives the first true inventor a limited monopoly
designed to promote scientific progress by providing incentives to
invent.3 9
Under modem American patent law, in exchange for granting the
inventor an exclusive right to control the use, manufacture, and sale of
the patented item, the federal government requires the inventor to
disclose with great specificity the patented invention.40 Disclosure is
accomplished through the patent application, which must contain a
specification and at least one claim.41 One or more claims must point
out and claim with particularity the subject matter that the patent
applicant regards as the invention.4 2
Patent infringement actions center on two questions. First, the scope
and coverage of the patent must be determined through interpretation
of the patent claim; second, the device or process in question must be
compared to the patent to discover if the defendant has made, used, or
sold a device or process in violation of the patent.' Juries have played
a role in addressing the second part of the inquiry since the Patent Act
of 1790, which authorized juries to award damages. 4 The role of juries
in answering the first question is more muddled.
A fundamental principle in American jurisprudence, dating back to the
earliest days of the Supreme Court, is that construction of written
evidence is exclusively for the court.4 5 Indeed, early patent cases in
the United States classify patent interpretation as a question of law.46

38.
39,
40.

U.S. CoNST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
1 Stat. § 109 (1790).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).

41. Id. § 111. The specification must fully and clearly describe the complete invention
so as to allow a person skilled in the art to make and use the device or process. Id. § 112.
42. Id. § 112.
43. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853).
44. 1 Stat. § 109, 111.
45.
46.

Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. 180, 186 (1805).
Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (patent specification

interpretation is exclusively for the court because the trained judge is more likely to give
a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330
(1853) (construing patent is question of law); Seymour v. McCormick, 60 U.S. 96 (1856)
(same); Winans v. New York & Erie R.R., 62 U.S. 88 (1858) (construction of the patent is
for the court); Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. 305 (1858) (construction and resulting legal
deductions within the exclusive province of the court); Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31 (1878)
(construing patents is province of the court).
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However, within the Federal Circuit,47 two distinct lines of patent claim
interpretation cases have developed. In one line of cases the Federal
Circuit has consistently held that patent claim construction is exclusively a matter of law.4" In the other line of cases, beginning with McGill,
Inc. v. John Zink Co., 4' the Federal Circuit has held that if extrinsic
evidence is needed to explain patent claim terms, interpretation is a
question of fact for the jury.50 Reconciling these approaches was the
Supreme Court's objective in Markman.
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

The Court began by setting forth a two-part framework for analyzing
whether the jury should play a role in patent claim interpretation."1
The Court first asked whether patent infringement actions were tried at
law when the Seventh Amendment was adopted, or are at least
analogous to an action that was tried at law.52 The Court quickly
concluded that patent infringement cases, or cases similar to infringement cases, were tried in the courts of law in eighteenth century
England.53
The second part of the inquiry proved more problematic: whether
patent claim construction must, of necessity, be decided by a jury in

47. Since its inception in 1982, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has had exclusive
jurisdiction of an appeal from decisions of United States District Courts brought under
section 1338 of Title 28, which creates federal district courvsubject matter jurisdiction in
patent cases.
48. This line of cases begins with the first Federal Circuit case that addressed the issue
of patent claim interpretation, SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718
F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983), and continues with the following Federal Circuit cases: Fromson
v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Envirotech Corp. v. Al George,
Inc., 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1984); SRI Intl v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Senmed,
Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical Indus., 888 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Unique Concepts, Inc.
v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d
1384 (Fed. Cir. 1992); and Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
49. 736 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
50. 736 F.2d at 672. The progeny of McGill include Federal Circuit cases such as BioRad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Palumbo v. DonJoy Co., 762 F.2d 969 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 832 F.2d 581 (Fed. Cir. 1987); H.H.
Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1987); and Tol-O-Matic,
Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
51. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1389.
52. Id.
53. Id.

1997]

MARKMAN V. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS

961

order to preserve the substance of the Seventh Amendment guarantee.54 The Court found no easy solution in history. Because patent
claims were not statutorily required until 1870,"5 no direct antecedent
to patent claim interpretation exists.5 6 The Court then looked at patent
specifications as analogous to patent claims, but it found the few
reported cases silent as to the proper method of interpretation or the
allocation of issues between judge and jury. 7 The Court dismissed
Markman's argument that juries must have interpreted disputed terms
in order to render verdicts, finding no more ground for that inference
than in other cases involving writings.5" Indeed, during the eighteenth
century, it was common practice for judges, not juries, to construe
written documents. 59 Alternatively, Markman argued that even if
judges were charged with construing most terms within the patent,
juries construed terms of art. 0 The Court conceded that in Neilson v.
Harford,6' a discussion indicated that the jury played a role in construing terms of art, but it dismissed Markman's argument for two reasons:
first, it is a nineteenth century case, occurring more than seventy years
after adoption of the Seventh Amendment; second, no support in any
scholarly authority established that this was a common practice.62
Concluding that the eighteenth century cases were of little help in
determining the common-law practice concerning the allocation of patent
interpretation between judge and jury, the Court examined existing
precedent, citing Winans v. Denmead"3 for the proposition that construction of the patent was for the court.64
However, because neither history nor precedent provided a dispositive
answer in determining the proper allocation of patent claim interpretation, the Court turned to functional considerations.6 First, the Court
concluded that judges, not juries, are more likely to give a proper
interpretation because patent construction requires "'special training
54. Id.
55. 16 Stat. 201 (1870).
56. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1390.
57. Id. at 1390-91.
58. Id. at 1391-92.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1392.
61. Webs. Pat. Cas. 328 (Exch. 1841).
62. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1392.
63. 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853).
64. 116 S. Ct. at 1393. The Court discredited Markman's reliance on Bischoff v.
Wethered, 76 U.S. 812 (1869), and Tucker v. Spalding, 80 U.S. 453 (1871), by noting that,
in both cases, the Court distinguished between product identification and document
identification and found that only the former presented a question of fact. Id.
65. 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
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and practice.'" , Markman had asserted that juries properly made
credibility determinations of expert witnesses who often are called on to
testify concerning the technical terms in a patent claim, and the Court
conceded that, in theory at least, an infringement action could occur in
which a credibility determination of such experts could be dispositive.6 7
However, the Court said that "our own experience with document
construction leaves us doubtful that trial courts will run into many cases
like that.' 6S The Federal Circuit's view-that ambiguity and vagueness
validity, not interpretation-may have
are matters that go to claim
69
contributed to that doubt.

Finally, the Court reasoned that a need for uniformity and predictability favored allocating patent claim interpretation to the judge.70
Observing that a desire for uniformity encouraged the creation of the
Federal Circuit and the conferring of exclusive patent appellate
jurisdiction on that circuit, the Court concluded that uniformity would
be ill served by having juries decide issues of patent document construction."
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The decision in Markman created the issue of when the trial judge
should make the claim interpretation.7 2 At least two district court
judges have conducted pretrial "Markman hearings" to determine the
meaning of claim language.7 " One judge explained that the decision in
Markman gives the district court judge three options for resolving
disputes about claim language: (1) the court can try to resolve the
dispute from the paper record; (2) the court can hold a hearing; or (3) the
court can wait until trial and resolve claim disputes the evening before
the jury is instructed. v4
The decision in Markman will, in all probability, increase the number
of cases disposed of through summary judgment.7" In infringement

66. Id. (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.
70. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1396.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., ElfAtochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844,850
(D. Del. 1995).
73. Id. at 846; Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, Ltd., 906 F. Supp. 798,800
(E.D.N.Y. 1995).
74. Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850.
75. Id. at 857.
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cases, like other types of cases, a trial court can enter summary
judgment if no underlying issues of fact exist.76 After Markman, patent
a factual issue and, thus, will
claim interpretation will no longer present
7
not be a barrier to summary judgment. 7
Perhaps the most significant impact on litigation is that the Federal
Circuit will now be able to review patent claim interpretation de novo.78
Few litigants who win at the trial court can feel confident in the
verdict.7 9 Patent claim interpretation is made by considering the
patent claim, the specification, the prosecution record, and any expert
testimony that is now admitted solely at the discretion of the trial
court.80 Under de novo review, the Federal Circuit is empowered to reexamine all these materials anew; the litigant will have to survive what
amounts to two trials."1 The Federal Circuit has already shown a
propensity not to remand, but instead, as a matter of law, to decide
whether infringement has occurred. 2
A major criticism of the decision in Markman is that the effect is to
jettison the jury from patent infringement litigation altogether, because
the ultimate question of infringement is often answered by the interpreThis seems to directly conflict with
tation of the patent claim."
traditional Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, which holds that the
right to a jury trial should not be rationed,' and more recent Seventh
Amendment cases that have taken a more expansive approach to finding
a right to a jury trial.85 The Court's reliance on the functional abilities
of the judge and jury arguably crafts a complexity exception to the
Seventh Amendment, a development the Federal Circuit eleven years
ago specifically denounced: "Elbowing to one side the Seventh Amend-

76. E.g., Brenner v. United States, 773 F.2d 306, 307 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
77. See Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 857.
78. The Federal Circuit emphasized as part of its holding in Markman that it would
review district court interpretations of patent claims de novo. 52 F.3d at 984 n.13.
79. Markman, 52 F.3d at 991-92 (Mayer, J., concurring).
80. 52 F.3d at 1002-05 (Newman, J., dissenting).
81. 52 F.3d at 992 (Mayer, J., concurring).
82. In Markman, the Federal Circuit declined to remand. 116 S.Ct. at 1396. In Exxon
Chemical Patents v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2554 (1996), the Federal Circuit held that the lower court erred in interpreting the
patent claim and concluded there was no infringement based on its own interpretation.
Judge Neis, in her dissent, called the majority's conclusion extraordinary in that the
majority was requiring Exxon to litigate not'only its opponent's position, but also the
unknowable position of the appellate court. 64 F.3d at 1568-69 (Neis, J., dissenting).
83. Markman, 52 F.3d at 989, 993 (Mayer, J., concurring).
84. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
85. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
573 (1990).
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ment, and the compelling social and democratic (much less constitutional) bases for its existence, would be at best an unseemly judicial
exercise." 6 And yet, that is apparently exactly what the Supreme
Court has done.
ELIZABETH J. NORMAN

86. SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

